Beliefs, History, Culture and Conventions 

 

  History, culture, and conventions affect how we perceive behavior and, in turn, how we act. 

History, culture, and conventions affect how we perceive behavior and, in turn, how we act. 

Working Papers

Bargaining Under Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Second-Order Optimism (August 2017)
Online Appendix
(revise and resubmit at Econometrica)

Bounded Reasoning: Rationality or Cognition (This Draft: April 2017; First Draft: January 2016)
with Willemien Kets and Terri Kneeland

How Many Orders do Player's Reason? An Observational Challenge and Solution (This Draft: May 2017; First Draft: October 2014)
with Adam Brandenburger and Alex Danieli

Publications

Admissibility in Games
Online Appendix
with Adam Brandenburger and H. Jerome Keisler
Econometrica, Vol. 76, No. 2, March, 2008, 307–352

Self-Admissible Sets
with Adam Brandenburger
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 145, No. 2, March 2010

Forward Induction Reasoning Revisited
with Pierpaolo Battigalli
This is a much condensed version of Context-Dependent Forward Induction Reasoning.
Contains material that used to be in: When Common Belief is Correct Belief.
Theoretical Economics, 2012

The Context of the Game
Online Appendix
with Martin Meier
Economic Theory, February 2017